



TRADITIONALLY, Anglo-American national and international trade has
been governed by the principles of common law, including the rules of
conflict of laws and the law of the statute books. Contemporary commercial
and industrial interests throughout the world, however, appear to advo-
cate a new and separate law of national and international commercial groups,
unhampered by legal tradition or restrictions imposed by municipal law.'
Business arbitration is one of the means employed to achieve this result.
The customary inclusion of arbitration clauses within contracts-relating
to purchases, sales, credit or other commercial matters-to secure the ap-
pointment, as arbitrators, of executives of cartels, trade associations or
exchange institutions has enabled these organizations to develop rules
suited to the demands of dominant commercial and industrial interests.
The growth in the United States of this extra-legal use of arbitration,
subject at no juncture to judicial supervision, should challenge the compla-
cent and stir those who would place public interest before private gain.
The amassing of too great advantages by one sphere of interests is an
evil which the law must resist.' If arbitration may be perverted to upset
or avoid the balance imposed by law, an inquiry into the functiotn it is cur-
rently performing seems required.
The concept of business "arbitration outside the laiv" first appeared in the
United States among the recommendations of Owen D. Young 8 to the
International Chamber of Commerce in 1921.1 Mr. Young advocated,
t Special Attorney, Justice Department, and Professor of Law, Georgetown Law School.
The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. The term municipal is used in the customary international law sense, i.e., the
internal domestic law of a nation as opposed to private and public law of international
character.
2. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942) passim.
3. Chairman, Committee on Commercial Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States (1921).
4. See Young, International Comiwrcial Arbitration (1921) INTERNATIONAL CHAM-
BER oI COMMERCE DIGEST No. 3, 2. Mr. Young's recommendations to the Congress in
London on International Arbitration were influenced by his experiences as Chairman of
the Board of Radio Corporation of America in connection with the South American radio
consortium, which proved to be the basis of the international radio cartel. SeO TARBE.L,
OWEN YOUNG: A NEW TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL LEADER (1932) 137-9.
Similar recommendations were made to the London Congress by a Sub-Commission
for the regulation of international arbitration. The Commission was advised by Charles L.
Bernheimer, President of the Arbitration Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FIRST CONGRESS,
BROCHURE No. 13 (1921) 4, 5-21.
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both in foreign and domestic controversies, submission of American busi-
ness to arbitration tribunals sponsored by interested groups able to enforce
arbitral awards. He stressed that all participants in proceedings before
such tribunals should be members of organizations willing to "exert moral
pressure, if need be, in favor of carrying out the arbitration decisions tt-
side the law and sufficiently influential to make such pressure effective." "
Although these statements merely indicate a policy to be followed, they
become significant in the light of the rapid expansion, supported by com-
mercial organizations I and legislative enactments, 7 which arbitration
5. Mr. Young's fuller report is as follows: "The field of international commercial
arbitration is one in which the International Chiamber of Commerce may well play an
important and influential part. Its success, however, will depend on the recognition by
the Chamber and by its individual members of the inherent difficulties and complexities of
the situation. Ihe most important of these difficulties lies in the fact that, generally sieak-
ing, the business men of continental Europe rely upon a legal sanction for the carrying
out of arbitral decisions, whereas in the Uniteil States, as well as in England anil the
South American countries, a moral sanction has been shown to be, certainly for the presnt,
more effective than a legal sanction. To ensure the cooperation of these countrie% there-
fore, some system of arbitration outside the law must be provided. '
The report continues to the effect that the chamber itself should dvelop a code uf
arbitration designed for those business firms which agree in advance to abide by arbitra-
tion awards, the enforcement of which is based not upon a legal "but upon a moral sanc-
tion, such as can be exercised by the International Chamber of Commerce itself, and by
member National Committees, with all the force that business men of a country can bring
to bear upon a recalcitrant neighbor.
"Before agreeing to conduct an arbitration outside the law, even when both parties
should join in a request, the International Chamber should be convinced that the busines
men of both countries concerned are sufficiently well organized and that the business or-
ganizations are willing to exert moral pressure, if need be, in favor of carrying out the
arbitration decision outside the law, and are sufficiently influential to make such presrure
effective." Young, supra note 4, at 1-2.
A pertinent section of the Sub-Commission Report reads: "In the want of an or-
ganized federation for the branches of commerce that are not as yet internationally asw-
ciated, the practical American spirit has succeeded in arriving at the same result by means
of a convention among the most important Chambers of Commerce in North and South
America, whereby the Organizations which are a party thereto pledge themselves over
their signature likewise to uphold the institution of arbitration. Thus the merchants of
these different countries, when they stipulate an arbitration clause if they should fail to
observe it, would be responsible to their own central organization which is officially
bound to maintain it; and the fear of merited censure and of the moral and econmic
sanctions which the central organization is in a position to enforce against a delinquent
member will avail not less than legal sanctions, where these exist, to secure the observance
of the pledge that has been given." I XTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COr .RCE, FznsT Co-
GRESS, BROcHnn. No. 13 (1921) 15.
6. In 1931, ten years after the Young report, Mr. Comstock in a report to the Wash-
ington Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce commented on the extensive
development of arbitration in the United States. Over five hundred commercial organiza-
tions had supported arbitration procedure, and 1750 towns possessed arbitration tribunals.
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underwent during the subsequent decade.' Moreover, the fact that rela-
tively few actions for enforcement of arbitration agreements have been
brought into court, far from casting doubt upon the actual widespread
use of arbitration, as Mr. Nussbaum supposes,9 suggests that the Young
policy may have been adopted and that it now effectively side-steps judicial
strictures.
It has not been the express intent of American legislation or court deci-
sions to foster this kind of development. Fundamentally, "arbitration"
See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMnxERCE, PROCEEDINGS OF TrlE WASHINGTON CON-
GRESS, BROCHURE No. 78 (1931) 82.
7. See Federal arbitration statute: 43 STAT. 883 (1925) ; 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-5 (1940).
The New York arbitration statute adopted in 1920, N. Y. CONsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930)
c. 2, now NEW YORK CIvIL PRAcrcE AcT, art. 84, has been substantially followed by sev-
eral states. See: ARiz. CODE ANN. (official ed., 1939) §§ 27-301 - 27-311; CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. (Deering, 1941) §§ 1280-1293; CONN. GEM. STAT. (Rev. 1930) c. 302; LA. GEN.
STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) §§405-422; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1933) c. 251; N. H.
REV. LAWS (1942) c. 415; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 2:40; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
1938) § 12148; ORE. Comep. LAWS ANN. (1940) §§ 11-601 - 11-613; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1940) tit. 5; R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) c. 475; Wis. STAT. (1943) § 298.
The following states have enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act: Nevada, NEV. CoMe.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 510-534; North Carolina, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§ 898; Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) tit. 104, c. 36; Wyoming, Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1931) c. 7.
For compilation of complete texts see KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN AcroN (1941) 217
et seq.; for discussion see STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS (1930)
253-62.
Foreign arbitration legislation includes: France: Law of Dec. 31, 1925, [1926] RECUmL
P-RIODIQUE ET CRITIQUE (Dalloz) 4.25; 1 INTERNATIONALES JAHRBUCH FUER SCHIIEDS-
GERICHTSWESEN IN ZIVIL- UND HANDELSSACHEN (Nussbaum, ed.) (Berlin, 1926) (here-
inafter cited as JAHRBUCH) 180-1, 1 INTERNATIONAL YEAR Boon ON CIVIL AND
CommERcIAL ARBITRATION (Nussbaum, ed.) (New York, 1928) 203 (English translation).
For discussion see Domke, Arbitral Clauses and Awards: Recent Development in French
Law (1943) 17 TuLAxE L. REv. 447. Great Britain: The Arbitration Clauses (Protocol)
Act, 1924, 14 & 15 GEo. V., c. 39; The Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act, 1930, 20 GEO. V.,
c. 15. Netherlands :-Law of May 21, 1931, (1934) 4 JAnRBuca 7-8. These laws were enacted
to incorporate into municipal law the provisions of two Geneva treaties: the Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses (1923), and the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (1927). See Nussbaum, Treaties on Commercial Arbitration--A Test of Inter-
national Private-Law Legislation (1942) 56 HARv. L. REv. 219, 221, 223. See infra p. 48.
8. Even since 1931 arbitration has continued to expand. See (193742) 1-6 Ann. J.;
(1943-44) 1-2 ARBITRATION IN AcTioN. Sir Lynden Macassey commented in 1938 that
the development of commercial arbitration, both national and international, in the United
States had been "phenomenal." Macassey, International Commercial Arbitration: Its
Origin, Development and Importance (1938) 24 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS Socity
191.
9. Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 236-7. Mr. Nussbaum's discussion of arbitration
deserves special attention, since from the beginning of the century he has been a prom-




has always been considered merely a "speedy and inexpensive proceeding" o
between individuals to resolve or avoid litigation, or to interpret standard-
ization rules of products and marketing methods. The emphasis has been
upon the adjustment of specific controversies between parties neither one
of which occupies a strongly predominant position and the settlement of
whose disputes does not invade the interests of third parties."1 The danger
that arbitrative procedure might be used to overthrow this naturally
achieved balance and establish control by monopolies and cartels was not
generally foreseen, particularly since arbitration seemed to operate pri-
marily in connection with the product exchanges, a traditional fortress of
free enterprise. Nevertheless, such have been the changes effccted by the
growth of a more complex and highly organized economy that arbitration
now rarely functions at its former simplified level. Few commercial transac-
tions affect only the interested parties; the simplest contract may give rise te
unexpected repercussions. And with this expanding sphere of influcnce
has come the opportunity for dominant interests to weigh down the bal-
ance in their favor. Arbitration, viewed as a social instrument, has moved
from the sphere of isolated individual transactions into a realm where its
significance in the light of public interest may be overlooked no longer.
TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS UTILIZING ARBITRATION
The arbitration system has its origin in no unified or coherent plan. Dv-
veloping as an instrument of independent organizations, both in the United
States and abroad, its pattern may be traced through the various organiza-
tions which have made use of it. Agreements to arbitrate questions not
10. The facts reported in Electric Research Products v. Vitaphune Corp., 20 Del. Lh.
417 (1934), make it appear doubtful whether arbitration tribuvals are as decient as usu-
ally alleged: 162 hearings were held, about 8000 pages of testimony reported, M50,74 10
was paid for expenses including $1000 per day for each arbitrator-and no dccision was
rendered.
11. The difference between arbitration between individuals and modern organized
arbitration or arbitration dictated by leading commercial concerns becomes obvious vhen
contrasted with the arbitration provision in George Washington's will:
"... my will and direction expressly is, that all disputes (if unhappily any
should arise) shall be decided by three impartial and intelligent men, hnown for
their probity and good understanding; two to be chosen by the disputants, each
having the choice of one, and the third by those two-which three men thus
chosen shall, unfettered by law, or legal constructions, declare their sense of the
Testator's intention; and such decision is, to all intents and purposes, to Le as
binding on the Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United
States."
Cf. Kent, Pioneers in American Arbitration (1940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. Sil, 52-3.
It is clear that this arbitration clause can hardly have effect hkyond tiL prti, ft tiv
controversy.
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susceptible to private adjustment are employed by three general types of
organizations: (1) by individual business entities-corporations and the
like-one of which may be in a sufficiently strong position to control both
the terms of the commercial agreement (of which the arbitrative agree-
ment is a part) and the arbitration tribunal itself; (2) by exchange insti-
tutions and trade associations devoted to the advancement of particular
products or trades, arbitration agreements being controlled by these or-
ganizations in all matters concerning members or members and third
parties; and (3) by the International Chamber of Commerce, and, on a
lesser scale, bydocal or city chambers of commerce.
In each of these instances it seems apparent that, if the dominant coin-
mercial interests are sufficiently strong, few of these controversies will
come into court. 2 Moreover, the spread of proceedings may be limited
even within these three categories, for, if the tribunals set up by the first
two types of organizations function efficiently, it is not improbable that
they will absorb the majority of controversies, leaving few to the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, or to local commercial organizations, a
fact which Mr. Nussbaum may have overlooked.3
Individal Business Organizations. While only official investigation
could hope to penetrate the secrecy which surrounds the arbitration system,
the Carboloy agreement 4 is a published instance of the function of
arbitration between individual corporations. Carboloy Company, a sub-
sidiary of General Electric, having obtained an exclusive license under
12. Examination of the latest volumes of the New York Supplement discloses the
comparative scarcity of sales contract cases despite the tens of thousands of sales trans-
actions taking place daily within the jurisdiction of New York courts. The following
cases involving individual concerns illustrate to some extent the trend toward elimination
of judicial settlement of sales disputes where arbitration clauses are in use: Miskowitz v.
Starobin, 181 Misc. 445, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 786 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (litigation between buyer
and executor of seller dealing with liquidatiodi of joint business undertaking where ques-
tions relating to sale is only one of the issues) ; Methuen Heel Co. v. Tupper, 41 N. Y. S.
(2d) 357 (.City Ct. 1943) (actual sales litigation); Flamm v. Noble, 43 N. Y. S. (2d)
922 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (rescission of contract for fraud not excluding the possibility thit the
contract cZntaned an arbitration clause); Hauswirth v. Rosenberg, 180 Misc. 945, 43
N. Y. S. (2d) 206 (City Ct. 1943) (actual sales litigation in which no arbitration clause
was agreed upon) ; Popper v. Centre Brass Works, Inc., 180 Misc. 1028, 43 N. Y. S.
(2d) 107 (City Ct. 1943) (no arbitration clause) ; Lipschitz v. Rosenberger, 43 N. Y. S.
(2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (involving whether Army and Navy contracts are covered by
priority rules; no reference to arbitration clause) ; Onyx Oils & Resins v. Steinberg, 180
Misc. 315, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 583 (City Ct. 1943) (intervention of a governmental agency
in a private dispute; no reference to arbitration clause). 45 N. Y. S. (2d) contains no
sales cases.
13. Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 236-7.
14. Hearings before Senate Coinnittee on Patents on S. 2303, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) pt. I, 294 (hereinafter cited as Hearings). Agreement made Jan. 2, 1929, between
Carboloy Co., Inc. and Firth-Sterling Steel Co.
[Vol. 54: 36
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certain patents, relating to hard metal composition, from the German firm,
Krupp, granted a license for manufacture to Firth-Sterling Steel Com-
pany on the express condition that its prices, terms and conditions of sale
for all tools and dies made of hard metal composition should be no more
favorable to the customer than those to be established from time to time
by Carboloy.' 5 The agreement between Carboloy and Firth-Sterling
provided for arbitration of controversies which the parties were unable
to adjust between themselves,"0 and through a supplementary instrument IT
the form of arbitration procedure was agreed upon: "For the period of one
year from March 1, 1931, the parties hereby appoint Harold Norberg... as
the sole arbitrator over controversies which may arise between the parties
or either of them concerning violations of their respective obligations to
maintain the prices, terms and conditions of sale established from time
to time by Carboloy. . . . The arbitrator in performing his functions
shall act impartially between the parties." 11 Since the Mr. Norberg in
question was at the time of his appointment and subsequently an employee
of Carboloy,"9 there seems hardly any doubt that arbitration was used
here by Carboloy both to control prices at the expense of its licensee and
to prevent such a scheme of price fixing from coming into court.
'A similar predisposition to control through arbitration is illustrated by
the conditions of sale contained in sales contracts in almost every field
of business. A conference called by governments in Rome in 1928 to dis-
cuss unification of sales law was confronted with the argument that such
unification had in fact already been achieved by private groups without
participation of governments or legislatures.20 Thus the inclusion bf arbi-
tration clauses takes the interpretation of privately dictated rules out of
court and centralizes it in private hands.2'
Exchange Institutions and Affiliated Trade Associations. In the rules
governing arbitration promulgated by exchange institutions and trade
associations, the growth of the same pattern may be traced. Since the
last decade of the nineteenth century, membership in exchanges has been in
15. ibid.
16. Art. 17 of 1929 agreement. Hearings at 299.
17. Agreement of March 1, 1931, between Carboloy and Firth-Sterling Co. Hearings
at 303.
18. Art. S. Hearings at 305.
19. A letter from Carboloy Co., Inc., to Fansteel Products Co., Inc., dated Aug. 1,
1933, mentioned "Mr. Harold Norberg of the Carboloy Co." Hcarings at 320.
20. PAnEL, DAS RECHT DES NVARENRAUTFS (1936) 36.
21. An agreement betveen Hartford Empire Co. and Owen-Illinois Glass C,. in
which the two companies purported to settle betveen themselves questions of patent pri-
ority in order to control the patent pool in the manufacture of glass illustrates further
a utilization of arbitration to support large concerns to the detriment of those leb power-
ful. See Brief for the United States, pp. 84-7, Unitcd States v. Hartford Empire Co, U. S.
Sup. Ct, Docket Nos. 2-12 (1944 Term). See infra p. 58.
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many instances restricted to persons who could be expected to conform
to prevailing policy, and especially to those belonging to formal buyer-
seller organizations or trade associations. The exchange ceased to be
merely an agency for the collection of orders for purchase or sale and,
particularly in regard to products traded in international markets, became
the meeting place of these buyer-seller organizations. Max Weber cor-
rectly describes these changes 22 in referring to the English Cotton Trade
Association and the Corn Trade Association as exclusive clubs hav-
ing absolute autonomy in regard to the principles of common law
applicable to the business transactions in their field.23 Of the many
conditions required for membership most notable has been the enforced
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal established either
within the exchange institution or within the affiliated trade associations.
Still proclaiming their function to be standardization, these tribunals
helped the associations of the new exchange institutions to establish them-
selves as supreme arbiters of the trade and to maintain rigid restrictions
beneficial to controlling groups or cartels.24
Tribunals, as a result of this development, now not only promulgate rules
regulating the activities of all who deal in products within the scope of
the exchange institution, or trade association, but serve as "courts" en-
titled to the rule of stare decisis in all matters subject to their jurisdiction.
And this jurisdiction has grown most extensively. The basic arbitrationi
agreement of the International Bulb cartel gives to its permanently
established tribunal the power to dispose of all questions arising out of
both th original contract, of which the arbitration agreement is part,
and any amendments made thereto pursuant to the by-laws of the cartel.21
The only matter with respect to tribunal jurisdiction left open to question is
apparently the essential validity of the original contract.
In the capacity of disciplinary agencies, tribunals exact loyalty to the
orders and regulations of trade associations. A rule established by the
Diamond Center and recently imported to the United States from Ant-
werp 26 provides that "the penalty for non-compliance with a decision or
22. Weber, Die Ergebuisse der deutschen Boersenenquctc (Germany, 1901) 43 ZEiT-
SCHiSFT FuER HANDLESFRCnT 83.
23. Ibid. at 101.
24. The latter was accomplished by means of the charters, rules and by-lavs of the
exchange. See, e.g., Merrifield, Ziegler & Co. v. Liverpool Cotton Ass'n, 105 L. T, R.
(N. s.) 97 (Ch. 1911) ; infra p. 43.
25. Meinhardt, Die rechtliche Gestaltung internationaler Kartelle, insbesondere der
Gluehlampenvertrag (Germany, 1928) 2 ZETSCHRuT FuER AUSLAENDISC IES UND INTER-
NATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 460, 466 et seq.




award renders the member liable to expulsion and termination of member-
ship." 27 Those in control of the Diamond Center must be presumed to
know that even the threat of such a penalty for non-compliance may work
substantial injury.2 In another instance, tribunal awards have been en-
forced by securing from members of an organization an accepted bill of
exchange, which becomes the subject of suit if the drawee fails to comply
with an arbitral decision."
The rule of loyalty is in no way mitigated by the fact that awards may
issue from a foreign tribunal, particularly a foreign exchange tribunal, as
was demonstrated in ilIcrrifield, Ziegler & Company v. Liverpool Cotton
Association."° In that case a British dealer selling American cotton in
Germany had agreed to arbitration in Bremen. A controversy arose under
the sales contract; the British dealer, ordered by the German tribunal to
pay damages to the German purchaser, refused to comply with the order.
At the request of the German exchange, the Liverpool Association expelled
Merrifield, Ziegler & Company from its membership and thereby effectively
from the trade." Although an appeal may be taken from a disciplinary
ruling of this kind, it has merely a supernumerary function since relief
may be sought only from those in control of the organization or subject
to its command. Similarly, in the event of dissatisfaction with an award
the parties may appeal only to a committee chosen by the executive mem-
bers of the organization.32 That there is no real oppurtunity for presenta-
tion of controversies to disinterested persons is demonstrated by the fact
27. Ibid. This device seems so similar to the Young systen that few bu!incss firms
in the United States could have learned much of significance from the Belgian diamond
merchants. See also IVar Brings Diamond Center and Its Owen .lrbitration S.Vslc. to
America (1943) 1 AnBITRATIoN IN ACTIoN, No. 3 (March) IO.
28. For the organization of the international diamond cartel see PLVMtL'I , I:Txr-
NATIONAL COMBINES IN MODERN INDUSTRY (1938) 93.
29. See Meinhardt, supra note 25, at 469-70.
30. 105 L. T. R. (N. s.) 97 (CI. 1911).
31. Compare Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931), for court
enforcement of foreign exchange awards. The plaintiff and defendant, buth citizens of New
York, contracted for the sale and delivery of a quantity of zinc concentrates to the plaintiff in
the United States. The contract provided that all differences arising thereunder should
be "arbitrated in London pursuant to the law of Great Britain." As a result of such an
arbitration proceeding an award was made against the defendant and enforced by a New
York court. See infra p. 46.
32. The report of the Fortieth Conference of the International Law Association desig-
nated the following rules of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association as typical: "I. Any
dispute arising out of a contract embodying these rules shall be referred to arbitration
in London, each party appointing one arbitrator, who shall be a member of the Asso-
ciation or a partner in a member's firm, or a director of a company represented by a
member.., whose decisiun is to be final.... III. In the event of one of the parties refusing
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that, although parties may ordinarily select their own arbitrators, the rules
of most exchanges limit the choice to members of the institution.
3
The experience gained by exchange institutions and affiliated trade asso-
ciations has motivated cartel organizers to utilize the arbitration device
for their own purposes, 34 making use of the three basic functions of
tribunals-legislative, judicial and disciplinary. " The effectiveness of a
cartel depends upon the extent to which the obligations of its members to
sustain price and to remain within the market assigned to them can be
enforced, and also upon the extent to which members' customers
can be made subject to cartel rules. A "controlled" arbitration tribunal
having jurisdiction over all litigation between cartel members and over all
disputes relating to the cartelized product offers more than adequate oppor-
tunities to secure the ends desired by the cartel management. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged this fact in the statement: "It may be that arbi-
tration is 'well adapted to the needs of the . . . industry but when under
the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements which
unreasonably suppress normal competition, the action becomes illegal." Il
The International Chamber of Commerce. Representative of the final
type of organization utilizing arbitration, the International Chamber of
Commerce,37 unlike exchange institutions and trade associations, promotes
to appoint an arbitrator, or neglecting to do so for seven days after notice in writing of
such an appointment by the other ... or in case the arbitrators shall not within seven days
after their appointment agree to an award or appoint an umpire, or in case after the
appointment of such arbitrators or umpire they or he or any of them shall die,... then
upon application by either of the disputing parties, and provided the applicant pays at the
same time to the secretary of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association the sum of 12 2 s,,
the Executive Committee shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire who
shall be members . . . of the association to fill the vacancy or vacancies so arising ...
V. In case either party shall be dissatisfied with the award a right of appeal shall lie to
the Committee of Appeal of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association.... VI. The appeal
shall be determined by a Board of Appeal consisting of four members of the Committee
of Appeal of the Association in accordance with the Regulations of Association for the
time being of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association." INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS'N, RErORT
OF THE FORTIETH CONFERENCE, 1938 (1939) 273-4.
33. Ibid.
34. See Friedlaender, Arbitration hi, lnternational Cartcl Agreements (1939) 3 Aiu, J.
271 passim.
35. See Meinhardt, Das Schiedsgericht des lhternationalen Glueslampenvereinigung
(1928), 2 JAHRBUCH 166.
36. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30, 43 (1930).
37. See MAGNiER, LA CHAMBRE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1928) c. 7 passhi;
Dietler, Der Schiedsgerichtshof der Internationalen Handelskamnier sehe Organization
und Verfahren (Switzerland, .1935) SCHEIZERISCHE VEREINIGUNG FlER INTERNATION-




no particular product or trade, but seeks rather to join varied commercial
interests-Morgan, Westinghouse Electric International Company, Bank-
ers Trust Company of New York,"' to name several American firms-in
the common purpose of facilitating international commerce. The Chamber
takes jurisdiction of all members' controversies provided they are of inter-
national character, a fact determined by a central committee composed of
-until the outbreak of the war-representatives of twenty different na-
tions.39
The unique feature of the Chamber is the appointment of arbitrators by
national committees of countries specifically designated by the central com-
mittee. A nation such as Switzerland, for example, liberal in its treatment
of cartels,"0 may be intrusted with the task of appointing arbitrators. Sub-
sequently the central committee may send these "liberal" arbitrators to a
foreign country to render their decision-even to the domicile of the party
against whom the award is to be made.' The reason for this mobility
of arbitrators becomes apparent in the light of the rule that an arbitrator is
free to choose whether his decision is to be bound by municipal law; he
may choose-providing the opposing party does nut object-to act merely
as an amiable cornpositeur, in which case he is ni t bound by the law if the
land, or as arbiter, in which case he is. If he declares himself hound, then
whether it is by the law of the forum or some other law will depend either
upon his own discretion or upon the terms of whatever contract is in con-
troversy.4 3 At the conclusion of his deliberati ins the deeis, oi is returned
38. See AMagnier, op. cit. supra note 37, at 15-6.
39. Among the members of the committee these names aplijmar: Ren P. Duchemin,
the president of the Confederation G',n~rale de la Prmduets n Franiaise, and Guiseppi
Cuccoli of Banque Franeaise Italienne pour l'Amrique du Sud. See (France, 1929) 1 1z-
TERNATIONUX WIRTSCHAFT, ZErrscURIFT DER IN-MRNATIOxMAU:N HA:tIFLKAMML- 124,
129-130.
40. See Meinhardt, op. cit. supra note 25, at 44, 4t, ct seq.
41. Up to 1940 the Swiss committee appointed exclusively personnel of cartelized in-
dustry or high finance closely connected with cartel interests. Dietler mentions the
following persons appointed by the Swiss committee: Dr. H. Kurz, member of the
administrative board of the Swiss Credit Bank; Mr. Galvy, delegate of the bard of
management of the Swiss Bank Corporation; Mr. Laroche, president uf the Swiss
Bankers Association; Dr. Wischer, Secretary of the Bankers . sLciatin; Dr. Zoelly,
general manager of the Federal Bank; Dr. Stoss, general manager of the chemical
enterprise Sandoz, a member of the pool Ciba-Sandoz-Geigy and member of the Eumpean
dyestuff cartel. Dietler, supra note 37, at 829. For cartel cunnections of firms with which
these arbitrators have been associated, consult Bume, C.,xnTms: A CHA=.rat ro A Fnoa
WoR.L (1944) passim. The close interrelation butwen the International Chamber of Com-
merce and cartels seems to explain why the international steel cartel chose for its tribunal
the arbitration tribunal uf .the International Chamber of Commerce. See Hexner, Tim
INTERNATIONAL STFL C.RTE (1943) 106.
42. See Dietler, szpra note 37, at 10.
43. See id. at 11, 16.
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to the central committee which determines whether the award shall be
left to enforcement by courts or treated as a case "outside the law." Like
the operations of exchange institutions, a loose procedure of this kind
seems only too easily to lend itself to the exercise of cartelized power. On
behalf of the commercial interestwhich it undertakes to protect the cen-
tral committee may at its discretion utilize the municipal law which proves
to be the most advantageous and the most expedient."
"EXTRA-TERRITORIAL" ARBITRATION
In order to provide for the decreasing number of occasions when arbi-
tration cases come into court, pro-arbitration groups have sought to foster
a receptive judicial attitude toward foreign arbitration decisions. The
"extra-territorial jurisdiction" 41 of arbitration, i.e., the international at-
tainment of this objective regardless of the municipal law of the forum, 40
has been noticeably extended as a result of two important American cases.
In Gilbert v. Burnstine,4 7 an action on a contract made in New York and
performed in the United States and involving two American litigants, the
defendant refused to appear before an English arbitration tribunal in dero-
gation of the contract, believing that he could defend his case in the Amer-
ican courts even though he might be required to pay "damages." The
New York court, however, declared that the decision of the English arbi-
tration tribunal was final. Besides holding as a general rule that, where
a foreign tribunal has once assumed jurisdiction and made an award, the
decision must not be disturbed by any court, the opinion seems to adopt
the view that two American firms, and by logical inference either an
American firm and a foreign firm or two foreign firms, may in their
mutual dealings free themselves from the restrictions of American law
and the jurisdiction of American courts to which they would otherwise
have been subject; that the acts of an arbitration tribunal established abroad
are valid providing they are valid under the law of the "situs" of the
tribunal; and that the decision of a foreign tribunal is binding on the
44. Although the American Arbitration Association does not operate for the most part
within the scheme here suggested, since it is largely concerned with labor-management
problems and with arbitration between individuals where the decisions do not effect third
parties, the Association is very active in propagandizing tile entire field of arbitration.
45. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF ComMERCE, FIRST CONGRESS, BROCHURE NO. 13
(1921) 20.
46. This concept appears to have been suggested by the traditional definition of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in international law which is given as: "The exercise of jurisdiction
by the United States over its nationals in foreign countries to the exclusion of the cus-
tomary jurisdiction of authorities of those coontries." 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1941) 493.
47. 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706 (1931).
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parties even if one of the parties did not appear in the proceedings before
the tribunal, provided that this was in accordance with the law of the
"situs." In the Silverbrook case,*" where arbitrators were removed into a
foreign country for the sole purpose of rendering their award, 9 a federal
court similarly concluded that it could not "direct and otherwise supervise
and conclude an arbitration to be held in London, or... vacate, modify, or
correct any award that might be made... [or] reform, or modify the terms
of the contract by ordering an arbitration elsewhere or otherwise than agreed
upon by the parties." 1 In assuming this position, therefore, these cases "
would appear to have immunized foreign arbitration awards against any
interference and made possible indiscriminate enforcement.Y2
The legal reasoning basic to these two decisions, moreover, seems highly
specious and susceptible to a consistent explanation only on the most ab-
stract level of conflict-of-laws theory. Under the Burnstinw rule foreign
arbitrators have the status of agents of the parties to the original contract
with power of attorney revocable only by consent of the litigants. In the
Silverbrook case, on the other hand, arbitrators are regarded as agents
of the state in which the tribunal has its "situs." 61 This inconsistency,
although explainable by the rationale that, on the one hand, an arbitration
agreement is substantive and therefore governed by the law of the place
48. The Silverbrook, 18 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927).
49. Id. at 146.
50. Id. at 147.
51. The opinion in neither case seems to have considered the question of the public
interest.
52. While the law on the enforcement of foreign judgmcnts in the United States is
rather uncertain at the present time, it can be stated that the principle of Johnston v. Corn-
pagnie G ntrale Transatlantique, 242 N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121 (1926), is to be considered
the prevailing rule:
"After having sought the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal, brought the
defendant into that court and litigated the question there, he now seeks to impeach
the judgment rendered against him. The principles of comity should give con-
clusiveness to such a judgment as a bar to the present action. Dicey on Conflict
of Laws (3d ed., p. 455), states separately the rule as to foreign judgments pleaded
as a defense as follows: 'A valid foreign judgment is porsoram if it is final and
conclusive on the merits (but not othervise) is a good defense to an action for
the samne matter when either (1) the judgment vas in favor of defendant or
(2) the judgment being in favor of the plaintiff has been satisfied.'
"The law of the state of New York remains unchanged, and the French judg-
ment should be given full faith and credit." Id. at 3S3, 152 N. E. at 123-4.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895), requiring reciprocity in the country where
the judgment was rendered, governed the federal courts. However, the case lost its signifi-
cance (with the possible exception of the District of Columbia) because of Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
53. It is somewhat startling that an act of an arbitrator, hitherto owing allegiance
only to the private parties who secure him, must be treated as an act of a foreign state.
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where the contract was made,"" while, on the other hand, the actual "arbi-
tration" and the award is a procedural matter referrable to the law of thb
forum,"' nevertheless seems to underscore the facility with which theories
may be manipulated to advance the principle of "extra-territorial" arbi-
tration. Parry v. Bache,5" a Florida case in which a federal court enforced
an arbitration agreement-inconsistent with the law of Florida-on t1ie
ground that "arbitration goes to the remedy," may well be matched with
Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing Thomas Corporation,7 where a
Pennsylvania court enforced a New York arbitration agreement because
of its contractual character which required the substantive law to govern.
Among the foreign contributions to the principle of "extra-territorial"
arbitration are the Geneva protocols of 1923 and 1927, the former guar-
anteeing recognition of agreements which provide for foreign. arbitra-
tion,"8 and the latter the enforcement of foreign arbitrative awards.0"
Following in the spirit of these protocols, however, the courts of most
commercial nations appear to have gone further and adopted the rule of
the Silverbrook case, as decisions of the German Reichsgericht 00 and the
Swiss Bundesg~richt 01 attest, while English and French courts 02 have
54. For the effect of this principle of conflict of laws compare NUSSBAUM, DEUTSCHIES
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1932) 420.
55. PILLET AND NIBoYET, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE PRIvk (1924) 721,
n. 3. Arbitration tribunals atting in accordance with local arbitration laws are usually
considered "forums" in the same manner as are courts. Compare reasons for the Silverbrook
rule, 18 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927).
56. 125 F. (2d) 493 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
57. 313 Pa. 442, 170 Atl. 286 (1934). Since 1923 the New York courts have had no
opportunity to assert their position in regard to the problem of appearance of New York
residents before arbitration tribunals in a foreign state. In Meachem v .Jamestown F. &
C. R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914), and in In re Interocean Food Products,
Inc., 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't 1923), the New York court re-
fused to issue such an order.
58. See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 221-2. The protocol of 1923 was ratified by the
following countries: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain (including India and other colonies and de-
pendencies), Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Siam and Spain. , See 1 INTR-
NATIONAL YEAR BOOK ON CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Nussbaum, ed.) (1928)
239, n.
59. Ibid. The convention on the execution of foreign arbitral awards was ratified
by the same countries ratifying the protocol with the exception of Albania, Brazil, Japan,
Monaco, Norway and Polahd. Both treaties were prepared by the League of Nations.
For foreign legislation see note 7 supra.
60. See, e.g., (1927) 116 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DEs REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN 193.
61. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. Arn (1931), [1931] ENTSCNFIDUN EN DES ScHNVEIzER-
ISCHE BUNDESGERICHTS (hereinafter cited B. G. E.) I 295.
62. See (1931) 58 JOURNAL DO DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 90.
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supported the Burnstine rule. In Vita-Food Products, Ivc. Z,. Unus Ship-
ping Company " the House of Lords permitted the parties to evade a spe-
cific statutory prohibition of Newfoundland by mere agreement that the
contract should be governed by English law, though neither persons nor
transaction were subject to English jurisdiction. In reaching this con-
clusion, Lord Wright looked for guidance to the English practice in arbi-
tration "which imports English law as the law governing the transaction
... even where the parties are not English and the transactions are car-
ried on completely outside England." 5 A stronger indication of the
growing power of "extra-territorial" arbitration seems hardly needed; Eu-
ropean decisions of this nature would not have been possible before the
63. Although the International Chamber of Commerce attributes the success of the
arbitrition movement to the Geneva treaty of 1927 [see Palewsld, LArbitrag cn maitire
commerciale et It jiurisprudence do la Cour do Cassation (1933) 60 JOUIMAL u Droft
INTERNATIONAL (Clunet), 849-51] and assumes responsibility for its promulgation, the
Burnstine and Silverbrook rules appear tu have had considerably greater significance in se-
curing enforcement of awards. To some extent these rules transcend even American state
and federal arbitration laws, since the former take effect whether arbitration statutes are
in force or not. Their advantage is particularly evident in their procedural operation. In
the absence of an arbitration statute, a cause of action at law in derogation of an arbitra-
tion agreement can be reduced to a nullity by securing a more rapid termination of the
arbitration proceedings than is possible for the simultaneous court proceeding. Thus a
defendant is enabled to put in a defense of a foreign tribunal award that will prove fatal
to a complaint as long as the defense is not raised later than court procedure will allow.
Only in this latter event does lack of an arbitration statute prove disadvantageous to prac-
tical arbitration; for under state and federal statutes as well as under the Geneva treaties
arbitration agreements are enforced by interposing stay orders in court proceeding-, until
the tribunal decision has been reached, the ensuing award then being enforced by court
order made on the motion of the successful party. See 43 STAT. 833, S3 (1925), 9 U. S. C.
§§3,9 (1940).
64. [1939] A. C. 277 (P. C.). Plaintiff claimed damages in the courts of Nova Scotia
for damages to cargo resulting from negligent navigation. Although the bill of lading issued
in Newfoundland exempted defendants from liability for negligence, under the law of
Newfoundland such clause is void. The defendants relied on the express provision of the
contract that English law and not the law of Newfoundland should govern. The courts
of Nova Scotia and the Judicial Committee of the Privy1 Council declared the ship owner
not liable.
65. Id. at 290. A decision of the Hungarian Curia, P. II 8496 (1926) [Szszy, Das irtcr-
nationalrecliffiche Problem der inlacndischen Aner.enn un 1ad Vollstrechbarb:ejt asslacnd-
ischer schiedsgericlhtlicher Urteile (1935) 50 Zmsrscurrp FuER INC.-nAT I0IAS ATI..-I
(Neimeyers) 34, 35, n. 1], agreed that arbitration decisions were a stronger force than judg-
ments made under the exclusive jurisdiction of Hungarian courts. Limitation on the ex-
clusion of municipal law is to be found in the law of the Duchy of Liechtenstein (FuE=r-
LicHE JuRIsDiKTioNsNoRm, art. 53) which requires public certification of agreements pro-
viding for foreign arbitration tribunals. See ScnIrzEn, HAiwtz:cu Das IE,.n;ATo1n a.M&;
PRIVATRECHTS (1937) 345, n. 1.
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last war.66 That this development has come with the expansion, through
cartels, of private government regardless of and beyond the borders of
political frontiers is shown in the opinions of the French Court of Cassa-
tion" In declaring binding an agreement between two Frenchmen which
provided for arbitration in London, the Court virtually admitted that its de-
cision was founded not so much upon any theory of law as upon the practical
necessity' of submitting to the dictates of powerful interests in the trade;
the world market would be lost to Frenchmen if they were barred from arbi-
tration in the English Corn Products Exchange."8
The extent to which "extra-territorial" arbitration may upset even
the domestic law of the United States is indicated by a decision which
compelled a resident of one state to appear before a tribunal situated in
another state. In the Nippon case,69 the Pennsylvania court issued a de-
cree compelling a party domiciled in Pennsylvania to appear before an arbi-
tration tribunal in New York, since such a measure was the only means
of enforcing the contract. Yet, even a superficial study of the principles
of specific performance demonstrates the reluctance of American courts
to give positive instructions to persons to perform acts outside jurisdictional
boundaries. The Pennsylvania court seems to have regarded the arbitra-
tion tribunal as a public court of equal authority."° Indeed, the arbitration
tribunal was perhaps placed in a preferential position, since there is no
record of similar injunction in a case involving the jurisdiction of a foreign
court.
71
In circumventing the dangers arising from "extra-territorial" arbitra-
tion as disclosed in the foregoing exposition, the argument usually made is
1
66. Reference should be made especially to the decision of the Reichsgericht (Nov. 8,
1882) in which an arbitration tribunal wherever situated is considered bound by the law of
the country which would have jurisdiction were there no arbitration agreement. See also
Neuner, Zum Problem der auslaendischen Schiedssprueche (Germany, 1929 )3 ZMTscw1r
FUER AusLAENDIscnEs UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 37.
67. See (1931) 58 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 90.
68. This decision is not based on the Geneva treaty since the latter affects only subjects
of different nations. See, however, an Italian decision in which a court of appeal (Turin)
refused to permit agreements between Italians providing for submission to foreign arbitra-
tion. (1932) 59 JOURNAL fU DROIT INTMNATIONAL (Clunet) 1145.
69. Nippon KIi-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing Thomas Corp., 313 Pa. 442, 170 Atd. 286
(1934). See supra p. 48.
70. The opinion gives the impression that the court considered that the relations between
itself and the permanent arbitration tribunal of the Silk Association of America, Inc., were
the relations of two courts, not of a court and private persons authorized by private agree-
ment to "decide litigation."
71. judge A. N. Hand, in In re Letters Rogatory out of First Civil Court of City of
Mexico, 261 Fed. 652, 653 -(S. D. N. Y. 1919), points out: "[No] American or English
court has by an order directing the service of process aided a foreign tribunal to acquire
jurisdiction over a party within the United States." It can be assumed that where there




that they may be met successfully by the "public policy" defense in a suit
to enforce a foreign award.2 Yet the facts show that with respect to the
enforcement of even a foreign judgment the "public policy" defense has
been successfully employed but once and then only in a case not involving
a commercial transaction. 3 In no instance has an American court refused
to enforce a foreign arbitration award because of its inconsistency with
public policy. Pro-arbitration groups, however, fearful that the courts
may become aware of the real developments and may take a position favor-
able to the "public policy" defense, have advanced the suggestion that
nations "provide for the recognition of all arbitration agreements and
awards in all cases except where it would be considered as offending against
the common conscience of civilised nations." 7* It is not improbable
that this program was drafted with the American anti-trust legislation
principally in mind; in any event the adoption of such a program would
tend to nullify the "public policy" defense."
Pro-arbitration groups have attempted, moreover, to proselytize legis-
lative bodies as well as courts by employing the technique of contrasting
the superior arbitration system of foreign countries with those of the
United States and vice versa. In 1921 the two reports of the International
Chamber of Commerce "' attempted to convince European legislators of
their "reactionary" 7' attitude in not accepting the "American system" of
72. See NUSSBAuS, PRI-ciPLES OF PRIVATE In TnNATIuIu L.,\w (1943) 23tk-S.
73. De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309, No. 3715 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1073).
74. IxNTXATioxAL L.-w Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 33, at 213.
75. There have been some indications, however, of growing unrest even amnvng arbi-
tration groups. Several nations including Holland, Belgium and Germany [se I Gnoss-
MsANN-DoERTH, RECHT DES UEBFRsEEKAUFs (1930) 41] have suught the proteetkn ef the
public policy defense against the intrusion of the policies of the Ltndun Corn Eelc nge
into the affairs of continental trade associations, particularly with respect to transactions
with American and Canadian firms. JOEHLINGER-HIRCusTmIN, P.ixzs Lzs G i V.z u-
scn.-rFTs (3d ed. 1925) 313.
76. See note 5 sunpra.
77. See the Sub-Commission report: "In European countries, pervaded as they are by
individualistic traditions, organized institutions that curtail and limit the liberty of their
citizens for the common good, encounter an insuperable resistance, and even in the fields
of industry and commerce the spirit of association is not much in evidence, and with
difficulty submits itself to the discipline and to the restrictions which would be impo:ed by
the public interest upon the liberty of individuals." INTRNATIONAL C -.LiZn o'" Co1-
aMEcE, Fmsr CONGRESS, Baociuan No. 13 (1921) 15.
This should be compared with the report of the Federal Trade Commission on the
-operation of the Export Trade Act: "In seeking business abroad American manufacturers
and producers must meet aggressive competition from powerful foreign combinations, often
international in character. In Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, Sveden, Belgium,
Japan. .. businessmen are much freer to combine than in this country. They have de-
veloped numerous comprehensive combinations, sometimes aided by their Governments,
which effectively unite their activities both in domestic and foreign trade." Gxix.n m
DIcKIss, TNEC REP., ExPoRT PRIcEs AND E-ona C~r~z=s (,Vrs-Pums m Asso-
CIATiONS) Monograph 6 (1940) 115.
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arbitration, advocated by Mr. Young, which in fact did not become a
functioning reality in the United States until some years later. Similarly,
a joint Congressional committee preparing federal arbitration legisla-
tion was told that commercial arbitration had existed in France for 360
years, 78 whereas France in reality was the last of the nations to adopt
arbitration of an organized commercial nature.7 Again, in 1943 in con-
nection with war contract termination legislation,"' the Senate was erro-
neously informed that other nations, particularly France, were agreeable
to the submission of the national government to arbitration tribunals.8 '
Much point has been made also of the fact that arbitration is inconsistent
with the principles of totalitarianism,$' but even a superficial survey of
German cases between 1933 and 1942 reveals that this inconsistency is
merely theoretical.8 3 Moreover, judicial nullification of the amendment of
the German Civil Procedure Act of 1933,4 one of the few domestic stat-
utes of any nation designed to curb the exploitation of economic power
through arbitration, illustrates National Socialism's advocacy of "con-
trolled" arbitration.
BREAKDOWN OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS
The success with which cartels and international commercial interests
have exploited "extra-territorial" arbitration necessarily engenders a com-
78. Statement by W. W. Nichols, president, American Manufacturers Export Asso-
ciation. Joint Hearings before the Sub-Committee of the Comnnitce on the Judiciary on S.
1005 and H. R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) 32-3.
79. The commercial courts have been and are parts of the ordinary court system. Ap-
peal may be taken in the ordinary way.
80. Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs
on S. 1268, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) 437.
81. See Arnaud, La Clause d'Arbitrage en France (1935) 62 JOURNAL DU DROI INTER-
NATioNAl (Clunet) 720, 721.
82. See note 80 supra. Cf. Cohn, Commercial Arbitratiot; and the Rule of Law, A
Comparative Study (1940) 4 U. OF TORONTO L. J. 1, 27.
83. A study of the KARTELL RuNDSCHAU shows the very broad application of the
arbitration device in Germany.
84. The amendment, [1933] RIcIsGEsETzBLA'rr I 787, adding § 1025 II to the Conr
OF CIvIL PROCEDURE, declared arbitration agreements to be "without any effect if any party
to the agreement exploits its economic and social superiority for the purpose of compelling
the other party to enter an arbitration agreement by virtue of which the compelling party
would obtain a stronger position [than the other contractees] with respect to arbitration
procedure, especially in the appointment or rejection of arbiters." The Kammergericht,
however, subsequently ruled that these provisions were not applicable to cartel arbitra-
tion agreements, since market regulation by cartels was considered of greater importance
than the purposes for which the amendment was enacted. See HFDEFANN, DEUTScIIIIS
WIRTSCHArArsRazcIT (1939) 345. See also Decree against the misuse of economic power,
Nov. 3, 1933, [1933] RE cHSGES-TZBLATr I 1067; Law on arbitration agreements in cartel
contracts, Dec. 18, 1933, id. at 1081.
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mon interest between nations in the character of their individual municipal
law, since the law of one nation governing arbitration may now be imposed
upon that of another. The failure of most legal systems, however, to recog-
nize the ascendency of arbitration as means of national and international
market regulation, and to shape its operations in accordance with the
demands of the public interest, has resulted in the yielding of successive
judicial powers to arbitration tribunals. Only a few courts have resisted
the trend, and those with little success. Everywhere, in the capitalistic
world at least,s" legal restraints upon arbitration have been relaxed.
I;dependence of Tribunals. A distinctive feature of the increasing
power of arbitration tribunals is their independence of municipal law. In
England " and the states of this country which have adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act," conformity between the law as applied by arbitration
tribunals and as applied by the courts has generally been believed to be
assured by the right of the parties, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal,
to have the case "stated" to a court for its binding legal opinion. How-
ever, in a recent English case, E. E. & Brian Smith, Ltd. z. Wheatsheaf
Mills, Ltd.,s the court largely overthrew this rule. The technical legal
question of whether a buyer may ask for damages after requesting judg-
ment entitling him to reject the goods was returned by the court to the
arbitral tribunal for decision; the group of businessmen was deemed het-
ter equipped to interpret the "customs" and "habits" oof trade than was the
courL By reason of this precedent it is difficult to comceive either when
"custom" purposefully evolved by an associati mn w,,tuld not succeed in
place of the law of the land, or what legal rule is nOt included in this
definition of "custom."
In those states of the United States which have nut adopted the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, arbitration tribunals are not considered bound by
the law of the land. In Bryson v. Higdon," a North Carolina court stated
simply that arbitrators are a "law unto themselves." " In other ostuntric
the development is moving in the same direction. In French, Belgian,
Italian, certain South and Central American and some Portuguese courts
(the so-called Latin group), as well as in the courts of a number of Swiss
85. Compare arbitration proceedings between the Ru-,_ian guvernmcnt curpuratious
and business organizations of capitalistic states under the German-Russian treaties uf
Oct. 12, 1925. See Wertheimer, Das Doutsche-RuPssiche Abh'onanci zt r scdcdsriclrcrlcl
Erledigung Prvatrechtliclcer Sircifaelle (19241) ZEaTsclmy- ruEa DEuYcuH m. Ztvi.
PRozEss 358.
86. The Arbitration Act, 1934, 24 & 25 GEn. V., c. 14, § 9.
87. E.g., Nevada, North Carolina, Utah, \Wyoming. See supra nmte 7. For states
adopting arbitration statutes of the New York type, see also ibid.
88. [1939] 2 K. B. 302.
89. 222 N. C. 17, 21 S. E. (2d) 836 (1942).
90. Id. at 19-20, 21 S. E. (2d) at 837.
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cantons, arbitrators have, in the past, been considered "bound by the rules
of law." "' This principle, however, has been nullified by an interpreta-
tion which raises the presumption that whenever merchants agree to arbi-
trate they actually intend to subject themselves to amiables compositeurs,
not arbiters.
2
Tribunals Adjudicate Validity of Contracts. A second illustration of
the courts' relaxation of controls over arbitration tribunals is the manner
in which tribunals have been permitted to assume the prerogative of passing
upon the validity of the very contract by which they have been established."a
Cartel organizers formerly were concerned by the fact that the concept
of freedom of contract alone did not completely immunize arbitration
agreements from judicial interference;" arbitration tribunals could ren-
der awards enforceable in the courts only if the contract submitting con-
troversies to the jurisdiciton of the tribunal was valid in accordance with
the rules of conflict of laws." A means of overcoming this limitation upon
the "extra-territorial" function of arbitration was devised by -einrich
Ehlers," draftsman of intei:national cartel agreements between American,
British, and German manufacturers of low tension machinery. -le sought
to protect the cartel agreement and the awards made thereunder against
challenges based on the anti-trust legislation of the United States. Excision
of the arbitration clause from the cartel agreement proper and its inclu-
sion in a special agreement, supposedly endowed by the parties with an
independent existence, was the simple means to this end. Thus, it could
be argued that the arbitration agreement remained in force even if the
cartel agreement was judged void. In this scheme, Ehlers merely adopted
the doctrine of separability developed by the Swiss courts, and thereby
succeeded in making the arbitration tribunal the final judge of the validity
of the cartel agreement itself."
By employing two discrete pieces of paper, therefore, or merely by
stating the intention that the arbitration clause contained in the principal
agreement is to be considered distinct from the remainder of the contract,
a tribunal may obtain power to decide whether the contract by which it
was established is legal. The English courts, at least by dicta, have em-
91. Cohn, supra note 82, at 3-4, 13-4.
92. Id. at 4, 14. See supra p. 45.
93. See Hamburger, Zur Frage der Kompeten.-Kompetenv der Schiedsgerichte ig
Zivil-, Handels-, und Arbeitssachen (1931) 3 JAHRBUCH 152, especially 164.
94. See Meinhardt, supra note 25, at 460 and passim.
95. See id. at 466. The Geneva Protocol of 1923 as interpreted in Goldschmitt v. Arn,
[1931] B. G. E., I 295, adopted this principle.
96. See Ehlers, Praktische Gesichtspunkte fuer Schiedsabreden bel internationalen
Dauerzertraegen (1931) 3 JAHRBUCH 215, especially 218.
97. See Nussbaum, The "Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration
(1940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 609 passim.
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braced this latter theory. In Herman v. Darmwvhis, Lord Porter made the
following statement: "If two parties purport to enter into a contract and a
dispute arises whether they have done so or not, or whether the alleged
contract is binding on them, I see no reason... if at the time when they
purport to make the contract they foresee the possibility of such a dispute
arising, they should not provide in the contract itself for the submission
to arbitration of a dispute whether the contract ever bound them or con-
tinues to do so.... it may be true to say that such a contract is really collateral
to the agreement supposed to have been made. . . . ."1 Thus, another
judicial threat to the independence of action of arbitration tribunals is re-
moved.
Although foreign tribunal decisions determining the validity of the
principal contract containing an arbitration clause would appear to be
enforceable in the United States under the Burnstinc rule,10 " the question
ruled upon by Lord Porter has not yet been raised in United States courts
of higher instance, nor has the separability practice of employing two
distinct documents received outright approbation."" A change of this
character in the relation of arbitration to substantive law may. have an
important effect upon the relation between arbitration and governmental
agencies normally charged with the control of certain contractual relation-
ships. In Kramer v. Uchitelle,0 2 a controversy arose concerning the com-
pliance of a sales contract with an OPA order forbidding future delivery
of "cotton gray goods" at a price exceeding the maximum "regardless of
any . . . [prior] commitment." The seller refused to comply with the
buyer's request for arbitration, maintaining that the contract, including
the arbitration clause, was void if inconsistent with an OPA order. Chief
Judge Lehman, urging in a minority opinion the right of an arbitration
tribunal to decide the "effects of [the OPA. rule] . . . upon the obliga-
tions assumed by the buyer and seller," declared that "... it seems clear
93. [1942] A. C. 356.
99. Id. at 392. The Swiss Bundesgericlt in Goldsclunhitt v. Am, [1931] B. G. E.,
1 295, went so far as to rule, contrary to conflict-of-laws doctrine as declared in the Geneva
treaty of 1923, that a German arbitration tribunal had the power to determine the validity
of a contract made in Switzerland.
100. Since foreign tribunal decisions are enforceable if made in accordance with the law
of the situs of the tribunal, foreign tribunal decisions affecting the validity of the principal
agreement would be enforceable in this country.
101. Nussbaum has expressed the opinion that New York is adopting this practice.
See supra note 97, at 615. He makes the further comment: "In discussing the separation
practice, generally speaking, trade associations may develop a certain arbitration policy
in order to counteract adverse legislative measures and to immunize the trade as-odiation"
Id. at 613. In Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F. (2d) 978 (C. C. A.
2d, 1942), Judge Frank considers the possibility of an arbitration clause "sufficently broad
to call for arbitration of the dispute as to the existence of the charter party." Id. at 9Q.
102. 288 N. Y. 468, 43 N. E. (2d) 493 (1942).
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that by agreement of the parties any controversy concerning the existence,
scope or effect of the obligations assumed under the contract is a controversy
'arising under' the contract and also 'in relation' to the contract, and that
such a controversy must be 'settled by arbitration' in accordance with the
contract made by the parties." 103
The maj6rity, in giving judgment for the seller, however, did not up-
hold the arbitration clause, since there were no disputed arbitrative facts
in issue but merely the question of contract validity. The fact that a gov-
ernment agency was the limiting factor with respect to the contract may
have influenced the court's decision, particularly in view of the difficulties
raised by the similar circumstances of a German case decided in 1939.114
There the Oberlandesgericht Muenchen was confronted with the deci-
sion of a cartel arbitration tribunal which had ordered a member to pay a
fine for failure to comply with a cartel price rule; the rule in turn could
be obeyed only by violating a regulation of the price commissioner. The
court decided against the cartel member on the ground that the arbitration
tribunal, while necessarily having knowledge of the price commissioner's
regulation, did not by its finding establish any inconsistency between ad-
ministrative and cartel rules. Doubtless it was not the court's intention
to deprive the commissioner of the power to interfere in a cartel price-
fixing scheme violative of his regulations, but, in respect to the relations
between cartel parties, the court left the final decision on the effect of the
price statute to the arbitration tribunal. At all events, it seems hardly
material whether this principle of separability is ultimately adopted in the
United States since, ini view of the "extra-territorial" function of arbi-
tration, the foreign practice upholding the principle will be enforced as
the law of the land.
Tribunals Take Jurisdiction of Public Instruments: Patents, Trade-
marks, Corporations. One of the most conspicuous fields in which arbitra-
tion tribunals have usurped judicial control-and even control by govern-
ment agencies-is in the realm of patents and trademarks, and, to a lesser
extent, of corporation law. The supervision of these legislatively established
instrumentalities, situated strategically for purposes of control in the
public interest, has long been lodged with the courts. As long as courts
with proper jurisdiction remain in a position to declare a patent void or
unprotected against infringement, cartels or other monopolistic agree-
ments using patent monopolies to exclude outsiders and patent licenses
to control members must break down. Cartel organizers, therefore, sens-
ing this threat and observing the truth of the statement that a patent is
"little more than a certificate which gives its holder the right to go into
court and sue for infringement," I0" have sought to bring infringement
103. Id. at 474, 43 N. E. (2d) at 497.
104. 14 KARTELL RUNDSCHAU 288. The decision is dated February 13, 1934.
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suits, as well as litigation involving priority and validity of patents, under
the jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals. Wedded to arbitration, the patent
takes on a new regulatory significance. Cartel members may agree among
themselves, and with customers or other contractees of their members, that
litigation referring to certain patents is to be submitted exchsh,e y to the
cartel tribunal. It is true that an award by a tribunal affecting the validity
of patents binds only the parties to the case, together with those who,
under pertinent contractual obligations or the provision of by-laws, are
bound to recognize such a decision. This means that, while the "public-at-
large" is not bound, the entire trade constituting the cartel is so obligated.
Although an award growing out of an interference proceeding before a
tribunal does not bind the Patent Office, it is questionable who would have
standing to contest an arbitration decision if all the principal parties in
interest were already before the tribunal.
Organizers of national and international cartels have reason to regard
tribunal patent decisions as. enforceable and a guarantee of the continued
use of patents as instruments of cartel control. The decision in Cavichi v.
Mohawk Manufacturing Company "o" is indicative in this respect. The
parties had agreed that certain patent litigation which might arise should
be decided by arbitrators. When one of the parties refused to comply with
the tribunal award adjudicating him an infringer, a bill for enforcement of
the award was filed under Article 84 of the New York Civil Practice Act.
The defendant objected that a decree granted upon such a bill would inter-
fere with the provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitu-
tion, giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction in patent matters. The
Supreme Court, following the decision of the New York court,0 7 ruled that
the issue was not a patent but an arbitration problem and that the states
had jurisdiction in all arbitration matters within their own boundaries,
whatever the substance of the case decided by the arbitration tribunal. Al-
though it is not at all certain that the court would have come to the same
conclusion in a bill for the specific performance of the arbitration agree-
ment had the defendant not appeared before the tribunal,' this decision,
105. HAamroN, TNEC REz., PATENTS AND Fans EN a ISE, Monograph 31 (1941)
129.
106. 303 U. S. 522 (1939).
107. 281 N. Y. 54, 22 N. E. (2d) 233 (1939).
108. See Robb, The Arbitration of Patent Controversics (1942) 6 Ayn. J. 217. MIr.
Robb comments: "I may say that I believe that Sec. 2 and 3, 43 Stat. 33 [9 U. S. C. §§ 2, 3]
... afford ample ground for compelling enforcement of arbitration agreements affecting
patents irrespective of the manner in which the courts have heretofore interpreted this
section of the Statute." Id. at 225. But see O'Brien, Enforeen:t of Arbitration A9rce-
verts in Infringenwnt Disputes (1940) 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 289. Mr. O'Brien lblieves
that under the present federal statute, agreements to arbitrate controversies affecting the
validity and infringement of patents are beyond the scope of arbitration agreements that
otherwise may be specifically enforced. Cf. Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 Fed. (2d)
184, 186 (1930).
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has become the basis of present active propaganda 100 in favor of wide
adoption of arbitration in patent disputes between two or more indus-
trialists. Moreover, the case indirectly opens the way for arbitrative deci-
sion as to the validity of the patent, since this is a determination inherent
in a suit for infringement. 10
Cartel interests have even attempted to employ arbitration in an effort
to deprive the Patent Office of its traditional function of determining
priority among inventions. In Hartford Empire Company v. United
States "' the defendant glass manufacturers, Hartford Empire Company
and Owen-Illinois Company, agreed to resolve any patent controversy
among themselves. Ostensibly to consider evidence of priority, two ar-
biters were appointed, but, as stated in the brief for the United States,
"while thus acting as a private tribunal for the settlement of their con-
flicts by negotiation designed to obtain the strongest patents for the pool,
rather than by arbitration, Hartford and Owens informed the Patent
Office that they intended to arbitrate the pending interferences in order
to show that the 'Owens-Hartford controversies are not being settled
without a consideration of the evidence in each case.' Another reason
was to conceal the fact that Hartford and Owens were using the ostensible
arbitration proceeding to settle interferences in a manner most beneficial
to them, regardless of the evidence of priority." 12 As a result, out of 138
interferences only 8 were decided through award of priority as established
by evidence available to the Patent Office.
International cartel organizers and the friends of domestic patent arbi-
tration 113 profeds to believe that the public interest is sufficiently protected
by the mere possibility of an infringement suit or other court proceeding
brought by or against persons outside the cartel organization. The rele-
vance of public interest to private patent suits and the objection to the
solution of, any patent case by purely private tribunals on grounds of
public interest becomes clear in Judge Jerome Frank's dissenting opinion
in Aero Spark Plug Company, Inc. v. B. G. Corporation."4 "As we said
recently in Picard v. United Aircraft,"' stated Judge Frank, "there is
more at stake [in a patent case] than the issues between the two parties.
The decision of my colleagues relieves appellee but leaves appellant free
109. The Arbitration Association has taken a prominent part in this respect. See (1943)
1 ARBiTRATioN IN AcrIoN, Nos. 7-8 (July-Aug.) 3.
110. See Deller, The Use of Arbitration in Patent Controversies (1938) 2 At. J.
399,402.
111. 46 F. Supp. 541 (D. Ohio 1943).
112. Brief for the United States, supra note 21.
113. See Deller, supra note 110, at 409.
114. 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
115. 128 F. (2d) 632, 641 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). See also Radtke Patents Corp. v. Coe,
122 F. (2d) 937 (App. D. C. 1941).
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to sue others as alleged infringers, putting them to the expense-notoriously
great in patent suits-of defending themselves. It is well-known that threats
of such suits, because of that expense, often induce alleged infringers to
accept licenses on onerous terms rather than to engage in litigation. As
the exercise of a patent monopoly is publicly injurious when an invalid
patent remains at large, the public interest is therefore deeply involved.
And as, under the existing patent statute and decisions, no one on behalf of
the public can institute a suit to have a patent declared invalid we should, I
think, avail ourselves of this opportunity to wipe out the patent .... An
invalid patent masquerading as a valid one is a public menace." 11o In
the Mllorton Salt case 117 the Supreme Court fully realized the scope of the
public interest properly intrusted to courts in patent matters. Under the
rule of this case a patentee may base no complaint upon a patent if it is
used beyond the authorized grant. The rule is applicable not only where a
party to the suit has been damaged by such violation, but equally where
damage has occurred either to any other individual or to the public at large.
Arbitration agreements relating to patents would seem to frustrate the
effect of this decision no less than they frustrate control by the courts."18
In the trademark field manipulation of tribunal decisions to the detri-
ment of court and government control has been largely the same as in the
field of patents. Cartels seek to defend trademarks 11 employed as cer-
tificates of cartel membership, ° as well as the trademarks of their leading
members, against the allegation that such trademarks are of generic char-
acter and therefore not within trademark law. A German case 11 illus-
trates the extent of this protection. The Reichsgericit ruled in 1931 that
the trademark "Naehrbier" registered by a German brewery was generic
and should be stricken from the register. Subsequently the defendant con-
tinued to employ the term "Naehrbier" and included it among his regis-
116. 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
117. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 433 (1942).
118. In patentee-licensee agreements arbitration has also been used to effect the same
purpose. In Galion Iron Works & Mffg. Co. v. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A.
7th, 1942), the court impliedly declared valid the contractual provision "that the arbiter
should be vested with sole authority and power to receive, consider and decide upon any
complaint presented by either party claiming violation of the licensed contract with respect
to prices, terms of sale and payment of royalties. If the arbitrator should find that the
contract had been violated in any of these respects he w.-as authorized to assess as liquidated
damages and not as a penalty less than 100 per cent or more than O per cent of the total
royalty payments payable." Id. at 413. For the effect of price restrictions impozed by
licensee agreements of this kind see Meyers and Lewis, The Patent Franchise and the
Anti-Trust Laws (1941) 30 GEo. L. J. 117.
119. See Diggins, Trademarks and Restraints of Trade (1943) 32 Gco. L. J. 113, 114.
120. See, e.g., Crofter Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942] 1 All Eng. 142, 145 (H. Q.).
121. See (1934) 34 MITTEILUNGEN Da DEUTscHEe PATmr, TA: W.AELra 285. The word
"Naehrbier" means beer with food value.
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tered trademarks. Other brewers followed suit, using the trademark in
accordance with the promulgation of the Reichsgericht. By 1934 all Ger-
man brewers, including the plaintiff and the defendant, had become mem-
bers of an association whose by-laws contained a general arbitration clause,
The plaintiff in the earlier case now brought before the arbitration tribunal
of the association a new suit against a brewer who used the word "Naehr-
bier," seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the term "Naehr-
bier" wds not generic and that defendant be enjoined from using it. The
tribunal, comprising well-known persons in the brewery industry, decided
in favor of plaintiff, thus reviving the trademark extinguished by the
Reichsgericht. It seems plain, therefore, that as long as any potential
party at interest was bound by the "law" of the organization, the refusal
of state authorities to register the trademark lost any practical signifi-
cance. Had the defendant brought suit in the courts for annulment of the
arbitration decision, he might have met with success, but his relations with
his association would have been jeopardized.
The facility with which arbitration has tended to undermine control by
courts and governmental agencies in patent and trademark problems, may
serve as some.warning of a similar evolution in the field of corporation
law. The corporation, though the nerve center of private business on the
one hand, is subject, as an entity created by the state, to legislative restric-
tions which give it in part the character of a public instrumentality similar
to a patent. Although there have been too few cases to clarify the position
of American courts, historical precedent has shown that legislation designed
to control corporate activities may be nullified through the use of arbitra-
tion and the substance of corporate law changed to the detriment of the
public control of corporations. This was the fate of the so-called Bubble
Act 122 in England during the eighteenth century. According to Mr.
DuBois,"' its restrictions on corporate business following a period of dis-
astrous speculation were entirely abrogated by practices such as that used by
the South Sea Company in adhering to its own board of arbitrators, a system
so successful "that the business corporation appeared in the courts relatively
infrequently.... Legal issues were decided by counsel opinions or by' sub-
mission of disputed points to arbitrators." 124
122. 6 GEo. I, c. 18 (1719). Cf. 3 MAITLAND, CoLLECTaD PAPERS (1911) 90.
123. DuBois, THE ENGLISH BusINEss COMPANY AFTE THE BUnBLE Acr (1938)
2 et seq.
124. Id. at 125. It should be noted, however, that in the same period the East India
Company regarding itself as a public body expressed the view that "Arbitration, though in
general it may be suitable in disputes between individuals, yet is certainly not well calcu-
lated for public bodies and least of all, for the East India Company, if we consider the
solemn obligation entered into by the directors .... To assign the power of such decisions
to others, would be assigning away the rights of the proprietary and acknowledging the
directors to be unequal to the trust imposed in them .... The company has generally, and
from an early period... systematically resisted the interference by arbitration or otherwise
of extraneous persons in their affairs." Id. at 204, n. 287.
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A trend in this direction may be indicated in a New York case 125 in-
volving. the balance of power between stockholders. Two plaintiffs and
defendant, the sole stockholders of a small firm, had agreed to retain one
another in a position with the company for life provided faithful service
was rendered, and to arbitrate any disputes according to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. When the plaintiffs, representing a
majority of the board of directors, discharged the defendant, he appealed
to the arbitration tribunal which by reason of several complications for
which the parties were not responsible was unable to complete the arbitra-
tion. A new demand for arbitration was interposed by the defendant, but
the plaintiffs sought redress in the courts, declaring the arbitration clause
void and inconsistent with public policy. They reasoned, apparently, that
arbitration used in this connection was contrary to the legislative sanction
establishing and controlling corporations and, moreover, that the creditors
of a corporation had an interest in good management which could not be
protected by a tribunal established solely by three stockholders. In finding
the arbitration clause nevertheless valid and enforceable, the court seems
to have passed over a self-evident fact: that creditors, representing the pub-
lic, have an inherent interest in any transaction governing the conduct of a
corporation. And this seems no less so in the case of a small corporation
than in a large one, since in both instances actual management is in the
hands of a few. The natural consequence of decisions of this kind may
be the evasion of the public responsibility of corporate organizations
through the medium of arbitration. An even bolder approximation of this
end is indicated in the English case, Beattie v. L. F. Beattie, Ltd.,'2" in
which the court declared lawful provision in the "articles of association"
that "a dispute between the company and a member shall be referred to arbi-
tration." 127
Principle of Revocability of Arbitration Agreements Overthrown.
The limiting principle that arbitration agreements are revocable is every-
where subject to attack even in the case of common-law arbitration. Arbi-
tration is effective as a tool of trade associations or cartels only where
persons agreeing to arbitrate are bound to submit future as well as present
controversies to arbitrative tribunals. To achieve a degree of moral and
legal persuasiveness in attaining this end, advocates of arbitration advance
the theory that negotiation with respect to future controversies is a con-
tractual matter clothed with the sanctity of "freedom of contract," and
that decisions based upon agreements arising therefrom have the author-
ity of the stare decisis rule. Although this type of negotiation may have
the appearance of contract, the appearance is deceptive since true con-
tractual relations postulate the absence of economic duress, a condition
125. lMartocd v. Martocci, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 222 (Sup. Ct 1943).
126. 159 L. T. R. (x. s.) 220 (Ch. 193S). See (1938) 82 So. J. 521.
127. 159 L. T. R. (N. s.) 220, 222 (Ch 1938).
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inimical to the aims of cartel organizers. Moreover, characterization of
arbitration agreements of this type as solely a matter of "freedom of con-
tract," is incompatible with the traditional reluctance of English courts to
permit persons to agree to "keep out of court."
Pro-arbitration groups, however, buttress their position by suggesting
that the traditional English dislike of arbitration agreements 128 has its
origin not in any legal arbitrative defect but in the desire of judges to pre-
vent loss of income, since decisions disfavoring irrevocable agreements to
arbitrate and the dictum from which they sprang 129 were decided at a time
when salaries were still largely derived from fees.130 Another explanation,
offered by Judge Frank,' is that the courts shortly after Coke's day
succumbed to the "hypnotic power" of the phrase "oust the jurisdiction." 1 2
128. The early English history of arbitration is somewhat obscure. See CoHEN, Com-
mERcIAi AR IAATiON AND THE LAW (1918) ; Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbi-
tration and the Law (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 595; Jones, Development of Commercial
Arbitration (1927) 12 MiNN. L. REv. 240, 243-4. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth
centuries, the courts showed little favor to irrevocable agreements for submission of dis-
putes to arbitration. While revocable agreements were permitted, their enforcement was
first secured by a bond and later by damages. This type of enforcement did not have the
same effect as an irrevocable agreement, since the courts ultimately permitted the recovery
of only nominal damages, the theory being that no injustice could be done in forcing sub-
mission to the King's courts. See Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration-Interational anld
Interstate Aspects (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 716, 716-8; Opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978, 982-4 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1942).
129. Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 80a-83a (1609), 1 Brownlow & Goldesborough 64, 2 Brown-
low & Goldesborough 290. A bond was given for the faithful performance of an arbitra-
tion agreement. Lord Coke permitted the plaintiff to recover on the bond upon breach of
agreement, but observed that "a man cannot by his act make such authority, power, or
warrant [to arbitrate] not countermandable which is by the law and of its nature coniter-
inandable" (emphasis supplied). See Cohen, op. cit. supra note 128, at 84-170; Lorenzen,
supra note 128, at 716.
130. See Judge Frank in Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.
(2d) 978, 983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Judge Frank's suggestion is derived from comments
by Lord Campbell in Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 853, 25 L. J. 308, 313 (Ex. 1856),
overruling the dictum of Vynior's case. Compare dictum in Park Construction Company
v. Independent School District No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 185, 296 N. W. 475, 477 (1941):
"The historical and only basis for the opinion that executory agreements to arbitrate all
issues to arise under a contract are void, as against public policy, is open to serious question.
There is eminent authority... that the rule was a product of judicial jealousy rather than
judicial reaioning." See also COHEN, op. cit. supra note 128, at 253 et seq.; Sayre, .sipra
note 128, at 609.
131. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. (2d) 978, 984
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
132. In explaining the traditional position against arbitration, of whieh he disapproved,
Lord Campbell stated: "Where an action is indispensable, you cannot oust the Court of its
jurisdiction over the subject, because justice cannot be done without the exercise of that
jurisdiction. That is all, and there is no doubt about that. This is the foundation of the
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Appeal to historical example is often tenuous, but even in the particular
instance chosen, Vynior's case,133 no theory of judicial rapaciousness is
necessary to explain Coke's dictum; it merely conforms with the law of
the period. 34
Nevertheless, such has been the success of these arguments that few
modern cases support the older English view.' In Park Construction
Company v. Independent School District No. 32 130 the court declared that
a Minnesota statute containing an arbitration clause which covered future
litigation only within a specified scope should be interpreted as permitting
unlimited scope to such clauses. "It is enough," stated the opinion, "that
the legislature has declared for arbitration, both statutory and common-
law. That fixes the policy of this state for, rather than against, arbitra-
tion." -"7 This decision indicates even with respect to common la,.,, the
final removal of the means by which courts may curb the execution of
agreements designed to submit all forms of litigation to arbitration. Far
from inhibiting the growth of arbitration by succumbing to the "hypnotic
power" of legal phrases, the present-day courts have been more inclined to
respond to the hypnotic power of "independent arbitration."
Principle of Impartiality Weakened. Arbitration tribunals have also
sought escape from judicial restraint by attempting to attenuate the estab-
lished principle of "impartiality of judges." In the famous case of Dr.
Bonham,"3 Lord Coke rebuked the censors of the Royal College of Physi-
cians for imprisoning a physician who had practiced his calling without a
license. "The censors were to receive one-half of the fines," states the
opinion, "and therefore are not only judges but parties in any case that
comes before them. It is an established maxim of common law that no
man can be judge in his own case." 13' In startling contrast appear the
words of a modern court of review in First National Bank z. Clay "I": "All
doctrine that the Courts are not to be ousted of their jurisdiction." Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L
Cas. 811, 853, 25 L. J. 308, 313 (E-_ 1856). For use of this doctrine see, e.g., Kill v.
Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (K. B. 1746).
133. 8 Co. 80a-83a (1609).
134. Under Roman and canon law iron whicl the English tradition in arbitration
seems to have been derived, the forfeiture of a bond because of a condition brolken through
revocation of an agreement to arbitrate would appear to be the rule as well as in Y'r.rr's
case. See Sayre, supra note 128, at 597. For discussion of arbitration in Roman law see
BUCKI AND AND McNAir, Ro.mAN LAW AND Common, LAW (1936) 316, 327.
135. One of the few cases is McKenna Process Co. v. Blatchford Corp., 304 I11. App. 101,
25 N. E. (2d) 916 (1940).
136. 209 Minn. 182, 296 N. NV. 475 (1941).
137. Id. at 187, 296 N. V. at 478.
138. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a (1610).
139. Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts: A Ree.ramination of the Famours Case
of Dr. Bonham in READ, TnE CoNsTrruTno. REconsidnim (1938) 15, 19-2).
140. 231 Iowa 703, 2 N. NV. (2d) 85 (1942).
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authorities agree that any person whosoever may be chosen to fill the
position of arbitrator .... It may not be the wise thing to do, but no
legal reason suggests itself to us why the-two parties may not choose a
third person to act with them as a board of arbitration. Choosing arbitra-
tors wholly disinterested is an admirable standard to aspire to, but the
parties seldom do that, and if all awards were set aside in which it was
not done, few awards would stand." "I' Thus, the theory of separability
of documents-finds its counterpart in the theory of the separability of a
man's mind: the separation of his judgment from his commercial inter-
ests. In Seaboard Surety Company v. Commonwelath,142 a Pennsylvania
court considered as well-established "the practice of making a state or
municipal official arbitrator of a controversy arising between state or mu-
nicipality and a contractor." The next logical step came in the English
case, Smith, Ltd. v. Wheatsheaf Mills, Ltd., 43 where the House of Lords
expressly approved the London Corn Trade Exchange practice o'f estab-
lishing for the final decision of litigation an appeal committee composed
of members of the exchange. Indicative of the trend in the same direction
is a decision of the German Kammergericht 144 holding a person a proper
member of a cartel arbitration tribunal notwithstanding the fact that lie
was also a member of the cartel management. The basis for the decision
was that the functions performed in cartel management were exercised not
by the individual per se but in his capacity as a member of the corporation
board to which the management had been entrusted.Y45 The president of a
German cartel, experienced in the actual operation of organized arbitra-
tion and viewing in 1925 such decisions with alarm, appealed to public and
government .alike to remedy this kind of "impartiality" which, if un-
checked, would place in jeopardy the public faith in justice.140
Self-Enforcement of Awards. Although it is usually assumed that the
recipient of an arbitration order is legally free to disregard its directions
until forced to submit by decision of a court, 4 1 the emergence of a self-
enforcement policy in connection with tribunal orders represents the final
breach between arbitration and the law. A recent writer claims that be-
cause of differences in national legislation international commercial arbi-
tration must rely "upon moral rather than upon legal sanction." 148 It
141. Id. at 716,2 N. W. (2d) at 92.
- 142. 345 Pa. 147, 152, 27 A. (2d) 27, 29 (1942).
143. [1939] 2 K B. 302.
144. Feb. 4, 1938, (1938) 18 KARTEL. RUNDSCHAU 417.
145. See INTERNATIONAL LAW Ass'N, loc. cit. supra note 33.
146. See (Germany, 1926) 31 DEUirSCHE JURI TENZEITUNG 500, 5OZ. For discussion
see CALLMAN, DEUTSCHEs KARTELLRRCET (1934) 237.
147. See KELLOR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 139.
148. RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEAcE, TWENTY YEARS OF BusiNEss DIPLOMACY
THROUGH THE INTERNATIONALGCIHABER OF COMMERCE, 1919-1938 (1938) 317,
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would appear, however, that it is not "moral consideration," but an effective
self-enforcement policy that influences the "honest business man" in obey-
ing the orders of the arbitration tribunal. This, indeed, is the basis of Mr.
Young's system of "arbitration outside the law," as is well demonstrated
in the Merrifield-Ziegler case.14 In dismissing a petition to declare the
agreement between the Liverpool Cotton Association and the Bremen Ex-
change void, an agreement requiring expulsion of the recalcitrant mem-
bers of either association, the Chancery Division made the following state-
ment:
"[The agreement] ... is, according to the evidence, the result of at-
tempts to bring Continental associations formed in the interests and
for the protection of the cotton trade into line with the association,
and to inaugurate between the members of the association and of the
Continental associations a code of dealing and conduct similar to that
already obtaining betwveen the members of the association intcr so.
The importance of Liverpool, as the controlling centre of the cotton
trade in Europe, necessarily results in members of the association
being in constant contractual relationship with traders on the Con-
tinent, and, experience having demonstrated the difficulties not infre-
quently arising in enforcing judgments and awards out of the juris-
diction, the association determined to take stepb to remove these diffi-
culties and to facilitate the settlement of disputes with foreigners
and the obtaining of prompt settlement of claims for payment
and damages, and, by making the advantages reciprucal, to secure
and retain the confidence of Continental buyers. This policy... falls
w.. ithin the powers of the ... memorandum of association." lc,,
This decision leaves to American courts the question of the validity of
the Mierrifield-Ziegler type of agreement under the anti-trust laws. The
closest analogy is to be found in Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation T.
United States,' where the Supreme Court condemned as suppressing
normal competition an arrangement whereby the organized motion picture
industry obliged its members not to do business with any firm which re-
fused to sign a standard contract. Disregard of arbitration awards was
made punishable in the Paramount case by requiring the offenders to fur-
nish substantial guarantee funds before permission was granted to resume
business relations with members of the industry. Only slight differences
appear in the Ziegler type agreement and the motion picture industry ar-
rangement. In the latter the self-enforcement of awards is a part of the
buyer-seller arrangement, whereas in the Ziegler case it is conditioned upon
149. Merrifield, Ziegler & Co. v. Liverpool Cotton Ass'n, 105 L. T. R. (ii. s.) 97 (Ch.
1911).
150. Id. at 104.
151. 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
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the actions of participating trade associations not directly connected with
the sales contract. From the point of view of anti-trust legislation there
is no discernible difference between the two self-enforcement systems. It
is not inconceivable, however, that unless the prevailing favorable atti-
tude toward the arbitration device is modified, this slight distinction may
serve as grounds for sanctioning the Ziegler type of self-enforcement.
American firms need not become direct participants in an expulsory scheme
inconsistent with the anti-trust laws. The disciplinary compulsion is accom-
plished indirectly. In international commerce in raw materials it is suffi-
cient that the foreign buyer alone be governed by the rules of an associa-
tion-as set out in the Ziegler case. Whenever he deals with an offending
American firm he is immediately expelled from his trade association with
the result that American firms which fail to comply with foreign associa-
tion rules suffer restricted trade relations. An American seller, therefore,
is as much subject to conditions dictated by foreign associations as though
he were directly within their jurisdiction. To attack this formidable re-
straint in trade by means of anti-trust legislation presents the gravest diffi-
culties. Yet evasions of this kind are dangers which should not be dis-
counted. 52
CONCEPTS OF LAW UNDERLYING MODERN ARBITRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Franz Klein, at the beginning of the century, sanguinely envisaged a
great expansion of arbitration, ultimately penetrating the law with far-
reaching effect comparable to the historical rise of equity.1" 3 Already
arbitration has intruded far into the legal system, but the analogy with
equity seems ill-advised. No theory in support of organized arbitration
can conceal the essential "lawlessness" of this form of "private govern-
ment." Equity, on the other hand, originally inspired by the church,
strengthened the legal process by drawing it closer to the demands of
natural justice. Law and equity together, under the control of persons
devoted to the service of the state, became elements of social coordina-
tion; organized arbitration, serving no "social justice," has become an ele-
ment of dissolution. Supporters of arbitration have argued, nevertheless,
that social justice may be served through organized groups and tribunals,
citing as examples city and feudal tribunals of the Middle Ages. But this
contention appears to overlook the fact that in the mediaeval hierarchy of
organizations duty and obligation played a prominent part, the lower
levels of society adhering to upper levels and both reaching the supreme,
152. See Kronstein, Industrial Combinations and the Law (1943) 31 GEO. L. J. 381,
passim.
153. K.EN, VORLESUNGEN UEBER DIE PRAXIS DES CIVILPROZESS (1900) 13-6.
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object of obedience in the sovereign. In contrast, exponents of modem
arbitration are bound only by common commercial interest, and if their
policies are consistent with the social or political ideals of a nation it is
more likely the result of accident than of design.15
Even religious history has been suggested as a source of ideological
support for arbitration.' Sanction for the avoidance of courts has been
found in the fact that not only the Jewish tradition preferred Rabbinical
scholars as judges to professional judges, but early Christian doctrine
also distrusted secular courts.1 5 Nevertheless, these arguments would
seem to work against themselves: Christian judges and the scholars of
Torah were preferred because they considered themselves bound by lav.
whereas pagans and professional jurists often did not.
Divorced from an ideal of social justice and designed to avoid the law,
modem arbitration would seem to rest basically upon Kelsen's theory of
law."'7 This neo-Kantian view emphasizes the cleavage between the moral
and social order, on the one hand, and "the law" on the other. Since there
is no relation between the two according to this theory, persons in a posi-
tion to exert political or legislative power would seem to be justified in
creating the kind of law most suited to their needs. Arbitration seems
clearly a product of this type of thought. It is questionable, however,
whether Kelsen's additional principle that the "law" is identical with
the "state" '58 gives adequate protection against abuse by private groups.
Such a principle would seem to require an ethical standard of "justice"
which Kelsen considers irrelevant in this connection. Left to its own re-
course, the "state," in the Kelsen philosophy, becomes as morally with-
out purpose as the "law," and both become neutered instruments of
groups in a position to exercise power. Modem realism, on the other hand,
encourages accepting as "law" any effective rule of society. According ta
this view, whatever arbitration itself effectively accomplishes, even if ac-
complished through a system of "private government," must be regarded
as the "law." A constructive service might be contributed by realists if
this broad approach were encouraged as a means of analyzing the phe-
nomena of socio-legal institutions, but without necessarily requiring ac-
ceptance of the ultimately disclosed facts as "law."
However classified, the underlying concept of law which permits the
development of the Young system to its present stage is colorless and with-
154. See Nazi utilization of arbitration, note 84 supra.
155. For the first reference to this suggestion see PvcnrA, DAs IN:SrT;Tr LM ScaM_s-
RIcHTER (1823) 7.
156. See reference to St. Paul, ibid.
157. See Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law And Analytical Jurisprudcnce (1941) 55
HAuv. L. REv. 44.
158. See KELSEN, STAATSLEE (1925) 108.
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out aim. Having no task it is a ready tool of those who would make use
of it. Although totalitarian nations represent an extreme instance of the
unprincipled use of this tool, in substance the distinction between this and
present non-totalitarian understanding of the relation between state and
law is a matter of degree.
CONCLUSION
An instrument of cartels and monopolistic trade associations, modern
arbitration appears not only to be incompatible with general concepts of
positive law, but even to attack in principle the practical mandates of the
Constitution. To effect protection of individuals against 'the unlawful
exercise of "judicial power," the scope of the due process clause must
not be limited to acts of formal "'judicial" bodies. It must include acts of
organizations which attempt to usurp judicial power. To a certain degree
the courts have unlawfully exercised judicial power-or failed to exercise
it-in condoning this usurpation. Although the difficulty of restoring arbi-
tration to its original function as a device for settling disputes between
individuals-a device limited and circumscribed without touching wider
interests than those of the parties involved-seems insurmountable in the
light of the present highly organized economy, the restoration of arbitra-
tion to a function "within" rather than "outside" the law seems a goal of
paramount importance. Court procedure must be expanded and made
sufficiently effective to serve the public interest as well as justifiable de-
mands of modern business. Until this is accomplished, both by domestic
legislation and international convention, the public and the government
should be assured that organized arbitration does not violate principles
of law, social justice and national interest. Temporarily, it is suggested
that the rule enunciated in the Paramount-Famous Lasky case be enforced;
that government and private parties be permitted the right to appeal to the
courts in all arbitration cases provided the public interest is affected;1
that the right to a declaratory judgment be assured in order to determine
whether trade customs under the control of trade associations or monopo-
listic enterprises are consistent with general principles of law; that licenses
be granted by courts to business organizations appearing before foreign,
tribunals or engaged in complying with foreign tribunal awards or com-
promises; that the Burnstine and Silverbrook rules be abolished. Imme-
diate legislative action to prohibit entirely the use of arbitration in con-
nection with patents, trademarks, and the law of corporations is also nec-
essary. A similar prohibition would insure the immunity of government
159. A sensible exercise of this right depends upon opening files and tribunal sessions to
government representatives.
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agencies from proceedings before arbitration tribunals,co a type of pro-
cedure advocated by some as an efficient means of terminating war con-
tracts.'61  Not the least of the tasks confronting government and private
research organizations alike is the further examination of the problems
touched upon here: the success of the Young system in domestic and for-
eign business relations, the extent to which it has changed or abrogated
common and statutory law, and, lastly, the deficiencies of court procedure
which have contributed with manifest success to the development of arbi-
tration "outside the law."
160. That the government itself is immune from arbitration seems probable from the
decision in United States v. Ames, 24 Fed. Cas. 784, No. 14,441 (C. C. Mass. 1S76),
where a government official was not permitted to submit to arbitration for the reason that the
Constitution prohibits the vesting of judicial power in any court except one established under
Article III. The question as to whether Congress may authorize executive agencies to
submit to arbitration appears to have been answered in the negative. Hcarings before a
Sub-co mnittee of the Senate Committee oi Military Affairs on S. 1268, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1944) 435, 437.
161. See the proposals made by the American Arbitration Association. Id. at 437.
Congress appears to have been sufficiently persuaded to permit an exception alloting the
submission of government agencies to arbitration in war contract cases.
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